IMPROVING PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ALLOCATIONS IN CLIENTELISTIC ENVIRONMENT OF BALOCHISTAN: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Successive governments in Balochistan have failed to streamline the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) despite repeated directions from the High Court and Supreme Court to plan it inan effective manner. This study discusses how political clientelism is influencing the process of PSDP by diverting scarce resources to create incentives for powerful political actors to keep the public dependent and poor. As a result, it is feeding extreme levels of exploitation and corruption in Balochistan. An analysis of the disbursement of PSDP in the 10 districts in last ten years clearly shows some districts with more population and area have been receiving less funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts. To over this inefficiency this research has formulated a mathematical model that estimates the amount to be allocated to each district, where the amount to be allocated to each district is a function of the total PSDP and the weights of population and area for that district. Then to further prioritise the projects of any department a performance matrix is developed. The matrix ranks the public sector development projects. The criteria used in the matrix are the themes obtained from the interviews and focus group discussions with the personnel of the relevant departments. Finally, this study suggests that a single approach for budgeting would make it difficult for government. The government must use a formulaic approach along with a participatory approach for effective PSDP allocation in the clientelistic environment of Balochistan.

PREFACE

The main aim of the study was the formulation of a mathematical model and the development of a matrix to improve the process of resource allocation in the PSDP of Balochistan. RASTA CGP is acknowledged for providing the opportunity to conduct this research study by providing us the funding and the necessary mentorship. We would like to thank our mentors Dr Asma Hyder and Zafarul Hassan for their valuable support and encouragement. Finally, our gratitude for all the participants of this research.

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PSDP   Public Sector Development Program

MCDA   Multi Criteria Decision Analysis

INTRODUCTION

This paper is about the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) in Balochistan. The provincehas always been on the development agenda of every political party but sadly we have not witnessed any meaningful development in the region. The growth rate of region is the lowest in Pakistan. After the 7th NFC awards and 18th Amendment in 2010 public in Balochistan anticipated an ear of sustainable development but this fiscal autonomy has proven a zero-sum equation. The PSDP is considered as a key component in improving the socio-economic outlook of an area. However, successive governments have failed to streamline it despite repeated directions from the High Court and Supreme Court to plan it in an effective manner. During 2017 and 2018 no new development projects were undertaken as the matter was sub judices. Even in years following the PSDP was challenged in Balochistan High Court and Supreme Court of Pakistan as the opposition claims the allocative efficiency and the distributive justice is very low. Finally, the opposition with the help of ruling party changed the incumbent Chief Minister in Balochistan as he was not addressing their clientelistic demands. The province is experiencing a clientelistic environment that is affecting the overall development of the area. This paper will discuss how effective PSDP allocations can be done in a clientelistic environment.

Contemplating on the events of last five years it is imperative to finds ways to improve the process of PSDP allocations. For this study resources allocation means the projects allocated in the PSDP to different departments and districts. In this paper wherever the construct of resource allocation is mentioned it means the PSDP allocations. The research has chosen this construct as it is more fittingto the literature. Ideally, the allocation in PSDP should be based on a prioritisation exercise keeping in view the challenges in the province, however in Balochistan political clientelism is playing a major role. Financial allocations are mostly done on the basis of what could be best described as an incremental approach: a certain fraction is added to the department's previous years' allocation every year without a rigorous investigation of the departmental needs and impact of previous allocations. Based on these issues the research has devised the following aim and objectives.

1.1 Scope

The research is focused to formulate a mathematical model and develop a matrix for only four departments, that are, health, education, social welfare and communication & works in the provinceof Balochistan.

1.2 Rationale

To suggest better methods and tools for improvement of PSPD allocations in Balochistan.

1.3 Objectives

1. To understand the influence of political clientelism on the process of PSDP allocations inBalochistan.
2. To suggest more effective ways for resource allocation in Balochistan.
3. To discuss policy inputs for improvement of PSDP allocations in Balochistan.
   Based on rationale and objectives this paper will answer the following three questions based on thefindings:

- Question 1: How political clientelism influences the process of PSDP allocations inBalochistan?
- Question 2: How effective resource allocation can be performed in Balochistan?
- Question 3: What are policy inputs for improvement of PSDP allocations in Balochistan? Before discussing the literature related to resource allocation let's examine the current system of development budget allocations in Balochistan.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Development Budget Allocation System in Balochistan

If we examine the ongoing process of budget allocation in Pakistan, it is based on budgetary demand, which covers both development and non-development side. On the other hand, the current mechanism used in Balochistan for development budget allocations can be best described as incremental (Green et al., 2000). Franklin & Ebdon (2020) and O'Hagan et al. (2020), claim that in theory, development budget allocation should be done with the involvement of focal persons in case of Balochistan the district officers at the grassroots level. However, contrary to Panday & Chowdhury(2020) and Williams et al (2019), in Balochistan centralized approach is used, where most of the decision are taken by the provincial capital, Quetta. Mostly, departments do allocations without involvement of key stakeholders such as people or private sectors (Escobar, 2018). Furthermore, any changes such as, addition/deletion in resources are done on political clientelism. This implies there is no specific plan or policy for development budget allocation in Balochistan as suggested in theory(Dias & Julio, 2018; Franklin, Krane & Ebdon, 2013; Glodfrank, 2012).

There are other weaknesses in the process, such as, we can hardly witness any productive debates being conducted for budget allocations (Head, 2007). Majority of budget meetings are rushed, and their sessions are not long enough to ensure that the process is as inclusive and successful as it should be (Bostan et al, 2021; Jobaid & Khan, 2018: Jackobsen et al, 2016). Finally, a budget document is presented in the assembly for approval without any discussion by the members. Hence, as argued byMcGuire et al (2020) the development budget allocation turns out to be a mismatch between the people's need, the required facility, and allocated resources. There is a huge gap between what certain districts actually need and what they get. To propose how PSDP allocations can be improved, we need to understand how this process is conducted in different countries. In the following sections we will discuss the relation between public expenditure and resource allocation and how it is influenced by political clientelism. Followed by an argument why we need resource allocation models and what are the different models that countries are using during budgeting and resource allocation.

2.2 Public Expenditure and Resource Allocation

Public expenditure efficiency has been a debatable issue for both academic and non-academic recently (Khan & Murova, 2015). Owing to the fact that public expenditure makes a huge percentageof domestic output and that it has a direct influence on public policy making may it be education, social welfare, public safety, health care or any relevant social issue (Khan & Murova, 2015). Albassam (2020) argues that to bring efficiency in public expenditure, budget allocations play a vital role in development and prosperity of an area. Therefore, dealing with public expenditure in

terms of resources allocation remains the hardest job, particularly, in cases of developing countries. In developing nations, it also has a significant role in monetary development and prosperity of people. There has been a lot of debate on resource allocation because the money involved in the process is the taxpayer's money and governments are answerable to them at least in case of developed countries. In addition, local governments in some countries have limited

resources and they need to get maximum utilization from them. Most importantly, the services offered by local government have strategic importance, as the reason for providing the services is to bring efficiencyand growth.

If we further analysis the importance of resource allocation during capital expenditure, it can be observed that there is a positive relationship between capital expenditure and growth rate. Though,there are researchers that argue that there is no association between the two. Thus, numerous studies have resulted in mixed results about the efficiency of capital expenditure, which makes the issue more complicated. For example, an empirical study was conducted by Landau (1983), in ninety- six countries, that concludes a negative relationship between government expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP). However, recently Albassam (2020), argues that public budget allocation plays a significant role in well-being and economic growth of the public, through programs that provides services, such as health and education. The research further argues that financial regulations mainly focus on expenditures rather than on revenues making the process more complexdue to peoples' dynamic demands. Therefore, scholars and policymakers are in search for effective models, that can help the decision-makers in allocation of resources wisely and effectively. Another major factor in resource allocation particularly in developing countries is the clientelistic environment caused by political clientelism.

2.3 Political Clientelism

The concept of clientelism like most of social concepts suffers a lack of consensus about its conception. Few researchers conceptualise it as a citizen– politician linkages that are commonly based on direct material exchange to small groups or individuals that are eager to sell their vote for the right price (Stokes, 2007). While another group of scholars explain it as an alliance between two entities of unequal power, status, or resources, where both parties reckon it beneficial to have such a relationship (Hicken, 2011). Another school of thought conceptualise this exchange as a way to tiethe client to the patron not via a rule of mutuality but by promoting a concern that the chain of benefit will break off if they do not act as par the wishes of their masters (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). While exploring different definitions of clientelism, Hicken (2011) highlights the following significant fundamentals of this relationships: contingency, dyadic relationships, iteration, and hierarchy.

Stokes (2007) while further examining the concept argues that in clientelism it is not necessary thatthe more powerful political actor take a public office. Even without a public office he would still be considered credible enough to promise his voters access to public resources. The powerful political actors reinforce their influence by giving their supporters traditional favours, that creates a sense ofobligation that the favour must be reciprocated in the time need. Access and control over state resources is vital for clientelism.

2.4 Clientelism and State Resources

Political clientelism, especially in developing nation has the capability to affect resource allocation of state related projects such as: subsidized health care, pension or unemployment benefits, community infrastructure funds or government jobs (Hicken, 2011). Political actors in such nations very effectively reward their followers with resources while others remain excluded. Berenschot & Aspinall (2020) claim that while doing so the politicians find ways to bypass, manipulate or abolish,official procedures of resources distribution. They replace the prescribed

standards for selecting recipients of government projects with their own political standards such as party loyalty. Apart from powerful political actors in case of some developing countries high degree of discretionary control over the state resources is exercised by their bureaucrats as well (Cruz & Keefer, 2015). They hold autonomous power, making them powerful actors in resource allocation. This control over the stateresources ultimately influences the development of a nation.

2.5 Why Clientelism Is Bad for Development of A Nation?

One of the most prominent debates in the clientelism literature is about the association of clientelism with development. Researchers assert that clientelism is predominant in developing countries (Brusco et al. 2004). The contemporary conception explains the connection between clientelism andeconomic development that it is not deterministic but probabilistic. Although the empirical association between development and clientelism is fairly robust (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci 2011, Berenschot, 2018), there are a variety of views about the causalmechanisms at work.

Hicken (2011) claims that clientelism hampers economic development by diverting scarce resourcesto create incentives for powerful political actors to keep the general public dependent and poor. As a result, it feeds extreme levels of exploitation and corruption. Ultimately creating a trust deficit in public to be sceptical about democratic foundations. There is a consensus among the researchers that it has immense negative repercussions on the functions of democracy, especially on capability of administrations to deliver necessary public policies (Gherghina & Nemčok, 2021). Apart from this, clientelism tend to change the basic accountability connection and hinders sustainable developmentin a region (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2011). Clientelism not only slow down the development of a country but is also stagnate its political institutions. The politicization of the bureaucracy is alsoassociated with clientelism. It obstructs the system and creates governance issues for administration (Keefer 2007, Cruz & Keefer 2015). Clientelist approach is bad for transparency as it discourages information sharing and collaboration (Keefer 2007).

There is a sizeable number of studies that claim a relationship between the size of the public sector and clientelism, whether calculated in terms of wage bills, development funds or jobs (Grzymala- Busse 2008). It is attributed as one of the main factors for public sector inefficiencies and larger public deficits. Researchers claim a major variance in the types of goods and services offered in programmatic systems versus clientelist systems (Gherghina & Nemčok, 2021). In the later arrangement services and goods to general public are underprovided while in some specific constituencies such good and services are provided in abundance. The debate is still evolving and much need to be done to determine a structure linking clientelism with development. Instead of justtesting the hypothesis that development is negatively related to clientelism, researcher should try to originate other testable propositions as well. The research on clientelism is not restricted to nationallevel, there is a school of thought that debates about its influences on institutions.

2.6 Institutional Effects of Clientelism

The impact of clientelism on institutions is still not explored widely, most of the research have focused on offices of political parties. For example, Desposato (2007) argues that political offices that practise clientelist strategies acts in a different way than the parties that mobilize electoral support by providing public goods. Such political parties are more focused to consolidate public

resources and then supply it through their private links. Political parties that banks on clientelism have less cohesion compared to parties that do not use this strategy. Stokes (2007) argues that political clientelism not only hampers the economic development but also weakens democratic system and allows pressure groups to consolidate more power. It discourages administrations from offering services and goods to public as it serves the interests of politicians that thrive on poverty and dependency of voters (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2020). Clientelism weakens the democratic system byallowing selected voters to use their votes to convey preferences while others only vote for an exchange of minor payment or good (Desposato, 2007). The influence of clientelism on developmentand institutions ultimately leads to a poor nation.

2.7 How Clientelism Causes Poverty?

If we examine the conception of clientelism majority of them points toward the poverty of the clientspecially in context of poor countries (Hicken, 2011). It is pertinent to mention that most of these surveys are qualitative in nature and lack quantitative cross-national studies of the subject. Despite that if we analyse the qualitative literature, it can be concluded that clientelism is more prevalent indeveloping world compared to advanced democracies (Hicken, 2011). These studies have theorizedtwo distinctive justifications for the linkage between poverty and clientelism. The dominate explanation highlights that poor people value a handout more compared to rich people. Hence, if a politician wishes to hand out bonuses, he/she will target the poor. Whereas the second theorizing claims that compared to rich people, poor people are more risk hesitant so they will value a bonus in hand today than the guarantee of a progressive public policy for future. As Kitschelt explains, "poor and uneducated citizens discount the future, rely on short causal chains, and prize instant advantages such that the appeal of direct, clientelist exchanges always trumps that of indirect, programmatic linkages promising uncertain and distant rewards to voters" (2000, 857).

However, another school of thought argues that it is not poverty that generates clientelism, but it is the other way around; clientelism generates poverty (Robinson & Verdier, 2013). Scholars explain that in order to stay in power the powerful political actors can develop a strategy to hold back income growth and social mobility. While further discussing their case they present the example of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy that kept their voters impoverished and dependent on party. In other developing countries political parties discourages delivery of development-enhancing public goods and prefer provision of personal favours (Robinson & Verdier 2013) resulting a decline in productivity of country while increasing the dependence of people on favours from politicians (Medina & Stokes 2007). One may argue that both premises can be true; clientelism causes poverty and poverty causes clientelism. However, if we can do resource allocation in better ways then we can overcome clientelism. This raises the question how resources allocation can be done more effectively?

2.8 How Resource Allocation Can be Done More Effectively?

It can be argued that efficient budget allocations are key to sustainable development. However, efficient budget allocations are not as simple as it sounds, in practice mangers or administers can face many challenges. In case of developing countries, the issue compounds (Albassam, 2020) due to political clientelism as discussed earlier. Albassam (2020) asserts that having a resource allocation model for better allocation of government's resources helps governments to achieve sustainable development particularly in case of underdeveloped nations. Ebdon and Franklin

(2006) further argue that public policy implementation can be more effective if resource allocation is done in an efficient manner with help of different models and tools, such as involving the public or developing aresource allocation model.

Michael Lipton believes the reason of low growth in developing countries is the unequal and unfair allocation of resources between rural and urban areas (Lipton, 1977). Sechele (2016) further arguesthat as much of the allocation is done in urban sectors hence developing nations cannot achieve sustainable development. However, Lipton failed to explore the role of ideological orientations such as clientelism, due to which urban biases can fluctuate among countries (Sechele, 2016). Hence, despite the amount of money the government spends in developing countries, there still is a question mark on its growth because of clientelist approach (Khan & Murova, 2015). Talukdar (2020) while further exploring the issue identifies other factors that influence the budgeting process, such as political affiliation, previous years' budget, education and leadership's ability, the priority of local demands, personal traits of a leader, government rules and regulations, collaboration, and scarcity ofresources. All these issues can be accounted for if an efficient model is developed based on political, financial, and social environment of Balochistan. For this research to ascertain better ways for resource allocation in Balochistan it is prudent to discuss the most common resource allocation methods that are being used across the globe.

2.9 Most Common Resource Allocation Methods

In today's world there are many budgeting techniques that different governments and organisations use. However, here we will discuss the most common allocation methods.

2.10 Incremental Budgeting

An American Political Scientist Charles E. Lindblom, in his essay, titled the science of Muddling Through in 1959, presented the concept of 'incrementalism that helped the policymakers to look forthe middle way between 'bounded rationality' and 'rational actor model' in order to ease the processof resource allocation (Talukdar, 2020). In incremental budgeting an organization may utilize a gradual way to deal with planning when they basically increase or takes away from the earlier expenditures (Talukdar, 2020). So, incremental budgeting takes last year's real estimates and increases or deducts a fraction to achieve current year's targets. Since it is an unassuming and straightforward, it is the most widely used tool in developing nations. If the key cost drivers do not change from year to year, incremental budgeting is sufficient. However, to address the changing needs of the public need-based allocation is a better option.

2.11 Need Based Resource Allocation

Today countries focus more on getting information about the needs of the people to do resource allocation and the main method to resource allocation has been to look for variables that explain needs of the community and later assign them weights for resource allocation (Ensor et al., 2012). Formulas rely on the precision of the proxies and weights used that may seem subjective at times (Ensor et al., 2012). According to a study, conducted in Canada , the selection of variables used to proxy need can have an effective impact on the final allocations (Bedard et al., 2000). Bedard et al., (2000) claim that need based capitation models have been proposed as a possible alternative to funding approaches based on incermentalism such as in Balochistan. This model allocates

money toregions or services based on the population's age and gender distribution, as well as other relative needs of the area. In addition, decisions related to politics are also taken on the fact that how fast theycan address people's issues. Explaining it with example in the health sector, the weighted formula covers the community and hospital health services, prescription, and primary medical services. Then for each area weighted population is estimated on each of the above three components. Then these weighted populations are consolidated in a single weighted population in each area, which later is converted into the monetary target.

While conducting a study on spatial distribution in Bangladesh Jobaid & Khan, (2018) assert that at the time of development of budget or resource allocation spatial distribution should be considered. Most importantly they believe that the allocation should be made without any bias and influence because these influences and biases would turn some districts stronger and others weaker. Furthermore, governments should include each district's local government body to know their needand responsibilities. Furthermore, governments should adopt a bottom-up approach to understand the real development needs of departments. Finally, proper monitoring of projects should be done along with assessment of utilization of money that is allocated to these projects.

Three major arguments for using a formulaic approach to developing local budgets are performance, political goals, and fairness (McGuire et al., 2020). The efficiency in this context means that national money is spent as per policies developed for the wise use of resources. While equity states that justice can be provided equally, and every political party has a certain commitment and set promises with its community in terms of addressing their needs. Some developing countries have tried to shift away from historical resource allocations and toward resource distribution based on metrics that try to capture variance in need (McGuire et al., 2020). Anselmi et al. (2015) present eight resource allocation studies (six in Africa) that use population weighting based on demographic, socioeconomic, and health status characteristics, including mortality, as common components of allocation formula.

While need based allocation is still popular in many countries, there are governments that prefer more democratic ways for resource allocations. Contemplating on dynamics of political environmentscholars have designed a more democratic needs-based allocation method called the participatory budget allocations.

2.12 Participatory Budget Allocation

Participatory budget (PB) allocation is one of the most used allocation method. PB originated in Brazil in 1980s. It considers opinion of public and key stakeholders while allocating resources, public budgeting affects government's decisions related to infrastructure and other developments projects(Franklin & Ebdon, 2020). While arguing in favour of PB, Jackobsen et al. (2016) claim that it fosterstransparaency, promotes good governance and social justice by taking into consideration the marginalized groups, and helps in building good citizens.

Williams, St Denny & Bristow (2019) present evidence from United Kingdom on participatory budgeting claim that budget decisions are getting progressively difficult specially during the times of reduced public sector budget and austerity as the masses assume or demand for more public services. During such times the public also put minimal trust in a political process as they feel limited engagement in any political decision. The proponents of participatory budgeting assert that during such times we can gain public trust by involving them in the process. Each

government can decide the level of public participation depending on their promise to masses during elections (Rowe& Frewer, 2005). They may only inform them through objective and balanced information or can obtain their feedback about alternative opportunities and solutions. On the other hand, the public can be involved throughout the process to understand their concerns and aspirations in a better way. Moving forward the public and government can work in a partnership and decide the course of action through joint decision making. Finally, in rare scenarios the public is empowered by taking the final decisions. Usually, governments work between the two extremes depending on situation either the public is consulted through feedback, or they are given a joint role on decision making (Head, 2007). Escobar and Elstub (2017) argue that apart from these levels of participation we can also use innovative ways such as consensuses conferences, planning cells, deliberative polls, citizens' assemblies, and citizens juries to engage public at a micro level that can also facilitate deliberation and participation. They coined the concept of 'mini public' for such engagement. Mini publics are randomly nominated residents following the principle that stakeholders affected by the issue has anequal chance of being selected to ensure legitimacy of the process (Escobar and Elstub 2017).

In recent times there are more than 7000 such cases that have used particpatory budgeting (Dias & Julio, 2018). Additionaly, well reputed international organizations such as, United Nations and World Bank recommend the practice of participatory budgeting particularly in developing countries(Goldfrank, 2012). Therefore, during the 1990s, many Asian countries, including India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, were engaged in participatory planning and budgeting and many other countries are even adopting it recently (Panday & Chowdhury, 2020).

2.13 Multi Criteria Decision Analysis for Effective Resource Allocation in Balochistan

Apart from a resource allocation model this research also aim to create a decision matrix that can help the decision maker to select the best project for each department. The following section will discuss one such criteria for resource allocation.

Kurth et al (2017) claim that public administration has to take complex decisions that must create abalance among technical, economic, and political considerations. They have to face pressure from multiple concerns to ensure transparent technique for decision making (Esmail and Geneletti, 2018). For governments, efficient administration means prioritization of scarce resources in a reasonable and transparent way. Hence, decisions about resource allocation must involve all the stakeholders (Kurth et al, 2017). Dodgson et al (2009) while discussing this further assert that for decision makingin government projects the popular form of analysis was cost effectiveness analysis (CEA). While using this tool different project alternatives are equated through their costs for providing similar kinds of output. Whereas another less popular tool called cost benefit analysis (CBA), also considers some imperative goods or services that are economically insignificant in monetary terms (Gamper and Turcanu, 2007). Both CEA and CBA are systematic tools of comparison that gives monetary values to decision maker to rank or prioritise projects (Gamper and Turcanu, 2007). However, this research is focused on methods for comparing impacts in ways which do not involve giving all of them explicit monetary values.

Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is supposed to overcome the deficiencies of old decision-support techniques such as cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) or cost-benefit analysis (CBA) (Müller et al, 2020). Müller et al, (2020) assert that most importantly MCA can deal with qualitative measures

and uncertainties related to future impacts of a project. This tool is favoured by government organisationthat have used it in recent times (Melville-Shreeve, Ward & Butler, 2016). Previously used models such as CEA or CBA do provide a decision-making framework, however, MCA enables the use of quantitative as well as qualitative measurement scales (Nedeljković et al, 2021). For this reason, thetool is more suitable to address multidisciplinary problems such as resource allocation. Gamper et al. (2006) argue that MCA is ideal method if government need to find consensual resolutions to overcome conflicts.

MCA bank on the ruling of the decision-making team, while setting objectives and criteria approximating comparative vital weights (Reddy, Thokala & Duenas, 2017). However, for researcherthe subjectivity of MCA is a matter of concern because choices of objectives, criteria, weights, and assessments are based on choices of decision makers for achieving the objectives (Gamper and Turcanu, 2007). Stirling (2006) claims that this subjectivity can be tackled by using 'objective' data that can be measurable such as observed prices, population or any other index can also be included.He further claims that despite its subjectivity MCA, can bring a degree of objectivity, scrutiny, and honesty to the process of decision making that lie beyond the practical reach of CBA.

This study uses a more informed and objective form of MCA known as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). This tool was created with the goal of providing ordering for the option used in the criteria,from least preferred to most preferred option (Dodgson et al, 2009). The options used will differ in their impact on the objectives set by the government, and secondly no single option can be best in achieving objectives (Dodgson et al, 2009).

Kurth et al (2017) claim that MCDA is a better way to examine complex problems that involve a variety of non-monetary and monetary objectives. It helps in analysing the problem in light of realistic information that will allow data and judgements to be more objective. The main aim of this technique is to help in decision making, but not to take the decision (Kurth et al, 2017). This tool offers diverse ways of examining a multifaceted issue by gauging the impacts of options on set objectives (Adem et. al, 2018). They further discuss that multi-criteria decision analysis can be usedeither to assess things that are only proposed or to appraise things to which resources have previously been allocated. MCDA can also help public organizations in decision justification and checks (Dodgson et al, 2009). The formation of MCDA for this study is further discussed in the methodology part of this paper.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this section the procedure adopted to analyse the development budget allocation in Balochistan is discussed. For this purpose, secondary data was obtained from the provincial planning and development, education, health, social welfare, communication & works and finance department. Thedata set was composed of data related to PSDP projects of Balochistan from 2011 to 2021. Statisticalanalysis was performed using frequency distributions to understand the dimensions and distribution of the development budget.

The sample for the study is 10 districts of Balochistan selected using the multiple poverty index (MPI). Four departments namely, education, health, social welfare, and communication & works development projects are analysed to find out inequalities in resource allocation. Table one shows the top 5 districts having the lowest MPI values and the bottom 5 districts having the highest MPI values.

Table 1: Sample of the study Source: Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan 2014-15

Top 5 Districts		
S. No.	*District*	*MPI*
1.	Quetta	0.213
2.	Kalat	0.275
3.	Khuzdar	0.285
4.	Gwadar	0.293
5.	Mastung	0.302
Bottom 5 Districts		
S. No.	*District*	*MPI*
1.	Killa Abdullah	0.641
2.	Harnai	0.633
3.	Barkhan	0.627
4.	Ziarat	0.575
5.	Chagai	0.546

The table shows that Quetta district has the lowest MPI depicting low poverty and the district of KillaAbdullah has the highest MPI depicting highest poverty among the districts of Balochistan.

3.1 Mathematical Model

Further, the model was developed by using population and area as the constructs for the allocation of development funds. The weights for population and area were estimated and incorporated in the following model to calculate the estimated funds for each district:

$$R_i = P_T \, x \, (W_{Pi} + W_{Ai})$$ .... (1)

The equation 1 shows the allocation of resources to a particular district. The allocated resources of a district are a function of its population and area and the total PSDP. After estimating the funds for each district, the allocation of funds to each department was calculated by using the following method:

$$RDj = Rj \, x \, \frac{\sum Rj}{years}$$ .... (2)

Using equation 2, the resources to be allocated to each department are a function of the weighted average of the resources allocated previously and the resources allocated to the district.

3.2 The MCDA Performance Matrix

The matrix for this study is based on the Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (Dodgson et al, 2009). In MCDA, the preferences of the stakeholders determine the criteria for project selection. The weights given to each criterion are subjective and are dependent on the availability and fulfilment of the criterion.

The projects to be approved in the PSDP shall be scored on each criterion. The score of each criterionis then estimated as a part of the total weight given to that criterion. The total preference score is calculated using the following mathematical equation:

$$ST = w1si1 + w2si2 + \ldots + wnsin = \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_j s_{ij}$$ ------------------ (3)

To make a MCDA performance matrix this study focuses on the choice of key players to give more informed data. A key player for this study is a person who can give us suitable and substantial information for creation of our performance matrix for the MCDA (Dodgson et al, 2009). Key informants were selected to signify all the imperative viewpoints about the resource allocation in Balochistan. They were the people who cannot participate in the process of PSDP making but their values should be represented in the matrix to make an impact on the decision making. The study was not limited to the views of these key informants' supplementary informant from Department of Finance, Planning and Development Department and Chief Minister Office were involved because oftheir expertise and knowledge about the process of PSDP allocations.

While collecting data from these informants the researchers ensured that all contributors are given equal opportunity to give their viewpoints. It was ensured that the minority points of view are not marginalized in the process of data collection. They assisted the participants through the numerous phases, prompting pertinent knowledge and findings. Through knowledge sharing it was ensured that every participant also envision the larger picture to which the MCDA is working for this research uses one of the typical features of multi-criteria analysis known as a performance matrix (Dodgson et al, 2009). In such matrix each column describes the performance of the

options against each criterion and each row describes an option (Dodgson et al, 2009). This study will use numerical values for each criterion in of individual performance assessments that are often expressed as 'bullet point' scores, or colour coding in other research.

For this research the performance matrix is a key for the analysis of each project by any department.The departments can assess the extent to which their PSDP objectives are met by the entries in the matrix and rank their project for efficient selection. This spontaneous valuation of data will ensure timely and operative selection of projects for the departments (Dodgson et al, 2009).

Interviews

The scope of an interview changes with experience of the researcher and the research questions under consideration (Cannell et. al, 1981). For this study, the interviewer wanted to inspire the interviewee to share a detailed account about the process of PSDP (Emans, 2019 and Kelly, Bourgeault & Dingwall, 2010). The aim of these interviews is to increase information about resource allocation grounded from knowledges of the members of four departments (Willis, 2018). The investigators used both semi-structured and unstructured interviews. An interview protocol was developed to be used in semi-structured interviews. On the other hand, unstructured interviews were directed by a set of determined open-ended questions from the questionnaire, followed by questions that would emerge during the interview (Emans, 2019).

The main emphasis throughout the interview, was to follow the interviewee's knowledge and interest about the process of PSDP (Jones, 2020). The main test during semi-structured interview was to quickly develop a rapport because of limited time (Emans, 2019). To overcome this challenge, the interviewers strategized to introduce themselves first and then elucidated the purpose of their study. Confidence and trust were increased by confirming the contributors of the research that data sharedby them would be kept anonymous and confidential. Following that, the interviewees were enquiredabout his/her career and experiences. Then the verbal consent was taken before opening the proper discussion. During an interview, the researcher needs to be alert not to ignore the social role and power differentials between the interviewee and interviewer (Travers, 2019).

Transcription of Interviews

The contributors of this study mostly spoke Urdu, and few also spoke in Balochi as the lead PI is a Baloch. Interviewees were given the option to express themselves in any language so that they coulddeliberate their opinions better. Then the recorded interviews were translated/transcribed into English. After the process of translation, the transcripts might not be the verbatim representation ofthe speech. To lessen the subjectivity in the transcription, the interviews were translated and transcribed by professionals and then cross checked by the researcher to ensure it was closed to theverbatim expressions of the participants the text were cross checked (Henderson, 2018 and Loubere,2017).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Analysis of PSDP from 2011 to 2021 Graphical analysis

The graphic analysis comprises of bar graphs that show the disbursement of PSDP in Communication& Works, Education, Health and Social Welfare departments in the 10 districts during the last 10 years i.e., 2011 to 2021. The analysis begins with the most populated district and rest in descendingorder.

Figure 1: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Quetta

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
Communication %	8.8%	18.3%	45.9%	17.6%	15.9%	15.9%	14.0%	13.8%	22.1%	19.3%
Education %	22.3%	13.8%	22.9%	16.2%	16.5%	17.1%	12.4%	7.6%	5.7%	10.3%
Health %	18.7%	17.9%	13.5%	11.2%	11.7%	8.7%	18.3%	27.8%	17.4%	28.8%
Social Work %	12.9%	10.8%	36.2%	40.9%	55.1%	41.5%	69.3%	22.0%	6.9%	22.3%

Figure 2: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Quetta

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
Communication %	4.5%	4.8%	1.8%	5.9%	7.9%	9.5%	5.7%	5.2%	1.7%	4.2%
Education %	1.8%	5.8%	1.2%	3.6%	3.0%	2.1%	6.4%	5.1%	3.0%	3.7%
Health %	1.6%	1.6%	12.5%	13.5%	10.5%	3.4%	9.1%	1.2%	7.6%	5.9%
Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.1%	0.0%	5.2%	1.4%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%

Figure 3: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Killa Abdullah

Killa Abdullah

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	3.2%	5.0%	1.3%	4.5%	5.5%	4.3%	7.6%	3.5%	1.9%	3.5%
■ Education %	4.8%	4.1%	0.0%	3.2%	1.6%	1.9%	2.8%	2.1%	1.1%	5.8%
■ Health %	7.5%	8.9%	1.1%	2.6%	2.2%	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%	1.4%	4.2%
Social Work %	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.6%	9.0%	2.6%	1.1%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%

(Y-axis: Percentage of PSDP Allocated)

Figure 4: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Kalat

Kalat

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	2.3%	1.8%	0.6%	1.6%	2.6%	1.6%	2.2%	2.2%	1.2%	1.4%
■ Education %	3.7%	1.4%	0.3%	0.7%	1.2%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	0.8%	1.1%
■ Health %	3.7%	2.8%	0.3%	1.7%	2.5%	0.5%	0.7%	1.1%	0.4%	0.9%
■ Social Work %	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.6%	0.0%	0.0%

(Y-axis: Percentage of PSDP Allocated)

Figure 5: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Mastung

Mastung

Percentage of PSDP Allocated

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	1.8%	2.8%	0.8%	2.0%	1.8%	1.1%	2.2%	1.1%	0.8%	0.5%
■ Education %	3.2%	6.3%	0.3%	1.1%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%	1.3%	0.4%
■ Health %	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
■ Social Work %	3.1%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	1.5%

Figure 6: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Gwadar

Gwadar

Percentage of PSDP Allocated

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	4.9%	2.7%	5.0%	3.5%	7.8%	6.8%	1.9%	2.4%	1.6%	3.5%
■ Education %	2.1%	3.6%	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%	2.4%	2.8%	1.5%	5.1%
■ Health %	8.6%	10.9%	2.5%	5.4%	6.3%	10.7%	0.5%	0.4%	2.7%	3.0%
■ Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	10.5%

Figure 7: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Chagai

Chagai

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	1.5%	1.0%	0.1%	2.0%	0.8%	1.2%	2.9%	2.1%	2.2%	2.6%
■ Education %	0.7%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.9%	0.3%	1.1%	0.7%	3.5%
■ Health %	0.0%	2.5%	0.1%	0.0%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	3.0%
■ Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%

Figure 8: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Barkhan

Barkhan

	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
■ Communication %	1.7%	1.3%	0.0%	1.4%	1.6%	2.3%	0.8%	1.4%	1.0%	1.2%
■ Education %	0.9%	2.3%	0.0%	0.5%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%	0.5%	1.1%	1.2%
■ Health %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%
■ Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Figure 9: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Ziarat

Ziarat	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
Communication %	3.3%	1.8%	0.7%	1.8%	1.3%	1.8%	0.4%	0.3%	1.2%	0.8%
Education %	0.7%	1.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.4%	0.8%
Health %	0.6%	3.9%	0.6%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%	0.5%	2.3%
Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.3%	0.6%	2.0%

Figure 10: Percentage Allocation of PSDP among 4 Departments in District Harnai Comparative analysis

Harnai	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013	2013 - 2014	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018	2018 - 2019	2019 - 2020	2020 - 2021
Communication %	3.0%	2.1%	2.0%	2.5%	3.3%	2.3%	3.4%	1.7%	1.5%	1.8%
Education %	1.2%	0.5%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	1.2%	0.3%	1.1%
Health %	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.0%
Social Work %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%

A comparative analysis of the disbursement of PSDP in the 10 districts in last ten years can be seen in Table 2. The allocated percentages are averages for the last 10 years. The discrepancies in the allocation of PSDP to the departments are quite evident. Some districts with more population and area have been receiving less funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts. This inefficiency justifies the purpose of this research as currently the Government of Balochistan has noproper model or matrix to allocate the development budget to the districts or even to the departments in an efficient manner.

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of the Disbursement of PSDP in the 10 Districts

Districts	Population	Area (sq. km)	Communication& Works	Education	Health	Social Welfare
Quetta	2269473	3447	19%	15%	17%	32%
Khuzdar	798896	14958	5%	4%	7%	2%
Killa Abdullah	758354	4894	4%	3%	3%	2%
Kalat	412058	8416	2%	1%	1%	1%
Mastung	265676	3308	1%	2%	1%	1%
Gwadar	262253	12637	4%	2%	5%	1%
Chagai	226517	44748	2%	1%	1%	0.5%
Barkhan	171025	3514	1%	1%	0.5%	0%
Ziarat	160095	3301	1%	0.5%	1%	1%
Harnai	97052	2492	2%	1%	0.5%	1%

4.2 Application of the Model

The mathematical model was applied on the secondary data obtained for population, area and PSDP.For a practical use of the model, weights for the population and area of each district were estimated. Weight for each district is taken as a part of the total. Table 3 shows the weights calculated for population and area for each district.

Table 3: Estimated Weights for Each District

Districts	Population	Area
Quetta	18.40%	0.99%
Khuzdar	6.48%	4.31%
Killa Abdullah	6.15%	1.41%
Kalat	3.34%	2.42%
Mastung	2.15%	0.95%
Gwadar	2.13%	3.64%
Chagai	1.84%	12.89%
Barkhan	1.39%	1.01%
Ziarat	1.30%	0.95%
Harnai	0.79%	0.72%

The weights for population show that District Quetta is the most populated district (18.4%) but is among the smallest districts (0.99%) which can be seen from the weights. District Harnai is the least populated (0.79%) and the smallest (0.72%). Chagai and Gwadar (12.89% and 3.64%) are the largest districts but with low population statistics (1.84% and 2.13%). Khuzdar is the only district with a large area (4.31%) and the second highest population (6.48%).

The inconsideration of the population and area statistics leads to inefficient allocation of resources. More populated and large area districts are receiving lesser allocations from PSDP as shown in Table

2. Therefore, it is imperative to consider population and area as important factors while PSDP allocations.

The mathematical model estimates the amount to be allocated to each district, where the amount to be allocated to each district is a function of the total PSDP and the weights of population and area for that district. As a case, the total amount of PSDP for the Year 2020 – 2021 was set as the input and the estimated amounts to be allocated to each district are stated in Table 4.

Table 4: PSDP Allocation to Each District

District	PSDP Allocation in Millions
Quetta	Rs 22,931.35
Chagai	Rs 17,413.17
Khuzdar	Rs 12,753.79
Killa Abdullah	Rs 8,937.23
Gwadar	Rs 6,818.48
Kalat	Rs 6,816.93
Mastung	Rs 3,673.75
Barkhan	Rs 2,836.50
Ziarat	Rs 2,659.17
Harnai	Rs 1,779.23

Further, the amount allocated to each district is then disbursed to the respective departments. The disbursement is made based on the average amount allocated to the departments previously. This systematic allocation of PSDP, firstly, to the districts and then to the departments is an attempt to remove the inefficiencies in the current development budget allocation process of Balochistan.

Table 5 shows the proposed amounts to be disbursed to the departments of each district. The amounts have been estimated using the total amount allocated to the district and the historical dataof each department.

Table 5: PSDP Allocation to the Departments of Each District

District	Communication Allocation in Millions	Education Allocation inMillions	Health Allocation in Millions	Social Welfare Allocation in Millions
Quetta	Rs 4,393.5826	Rs 3,318.3420	Rs 3,990.8815	Rs 7,289.3862
Khuzdar	Rs 651.2791	Rs 453.7629	Rs 853.7781	Rs 216.6388
Killa Abdullah	Rs 359.9695	Rs 245.8815	Rs 266.4486	Rs 147.3774
Kalat	Rs 118.4333	Rs 88.8978	Rs 99.1848	Rs 52.8723
Mastung	Rs 54.7983	Rs 58.4778	Rs 16.6145	Rs 30.0288
Gwadar	Rs 273.2815	Rs 147.2720	Rs 347.3558	Rs 76.3506
Chagai	Rs 286.2321	Rs 149.8002	Rs 124.7293	Rs 36.4028
Barkhan	Rs 35.7451	Rs 25.2886	Rs 4.6268	Rs 0.0000
Ziarat	Rs 35.6205	Rs 11.2573	Rs 22.6733	Rs 13.0462
Harnai	Rs 41.9625	Rs 8.4472	Rs 5.5453	Rs 8.8776

Application of Performance Matrix

This performance matrix uses numerical analysis in two stages: Scoring for each expected consequences of each option are assigned a numerical score and then numerical weights are assignedto each criterion keeping in view their importance to the process of PSDP allocations.

The matrix is developed to rank the public sector development projects. The criteria used in the matrix are the themes obtained from the interviews and focus group discussions with the personnelof the relevant departments. Each project will be given a score on a scale of 0 -100 for each criterion.The score of each criterion given to a project will then be taken as a product with the assigned weight of that criterion. The final score for each project is calculated using equation 3 mentioned in the research methodology. The following Table 6 is an example of how health department can prioritisedifferent project for a given year.

Table 6: Project Decision Matrix for Health Department

ProjectName	District MPI Rank	District Pervious PSDP Funds	Infrastructurefor Project	Project Prerequisites	Project Risks	Score
P1	10	10	100	100	100	46
P2	20	70	100	100	100	67
P3	90	60	66	100	50	77
P4	100	30	66	0	50	51
P5	80	80	33	100	0	71
Weights	*30*	*30*	*10*	*20*	*10*	

Qualitative Analysis and Findings

This section covers the results of qualitative data collection and their analysis. This section analysesthe data to answer research questions later in discussion of this paper. Data findings are presented under two themes that emerged during multiple phases of data analysis and to create thick description observation exhibits are also added.

Theme 1: The process of PSDP Allocation Is Influenced by Political Clientelism

The initial objective of this research is to understand how political clientelism is influencing the process of development budget allocations in Balochistan. Finance minister expresses his concerns about political clientelism as follows:

Minister: A group of (influential) people would sit together and make a budget, similarly, if we look at the process of PSDP allocations it was free giveaway of projects to MPAs, Ministers, Civil Servants, and a group of influence people without a due process.

Whereas a member of provincial assembly from the opposition claims that:

MPA: Apart from this if we look at PSDP allocations in Balochistan over the of last 12 years since I have been member of parliament, I can say that either the projects are included on the wishes of contractorsor on the political commitments of the MPAs. We do build schools but there are no students or teachersto go to that schools, we build hospitals but there are no doctors or patients in those hospitals.

A senior official of education department further explains how political power works in their department.

DP1: …for example, if the government wants to open a girl college in any district, they must ask the department if a college is required there or not. However, they decide most of the projects on political

influence. MPAs directly approach the Chief Minister and would demand a college or school and his/her project will be included in the PSDP without checking the needs of the area or department.

When an official of health department was asked how they decided how fund are allocated yearly basis in their department?

DP2: For this we have a committee, but that committee has no say in the decision making. For example,in District Khuzdar we have all the opposition MPAs, so they hardly get any projects. There are ongoingprojects, but they won't get the required funds. As long as we have collation governments in Balochistan our resource allocation cannot improve.

Deputy Commissioner being the administrative head of the district shares his experience about PSDPallocations as:

DC5: I was studying the PSDP of last year and I could feel the influence of certain people. I won't take any names but there is one district that would be third or fourth most developed area in Balochistan but every second or third project was assigned to that district (kamal log hai hum).

Observation Exhibit 1 Kamal log hai hum
This expression of Urdu is usually used to express amazement, particularly about ability and capacity of a person. Here the interviewee is being sarcastic about the level of ignorance by the decision makers. He is expressing is powerlessness and frustration through satire.

Another Deputy Commissioner was asked then how do they try to address the issues and problems of the people living in his district?

DC3: …we will approach an influential contractor or a politician to addresses their issues. We do not have the capacity to addresses them at the district level. We can only address the administrative issuesbut addressing the financial issues is above our pay grade. (humaray par jal jatay hai).

Observation Exhibit 2 Humaray par jal jatay hai
This expression is usually used to express a constraint or the consequence of an action. The expression is usually used to express fear or helplessness for doing a job. The apprehensions are usually related to terrible consequences of an act. Here the person is indicating that if he tries to intervene in the process of PSDP allocations he can be punished.

While head of another district administration talks about his level of involvement in the PSDP allocations:

DC5: To be honest with you I had zero involvement the process of PSDP allocations, I sent a list of PSDP,but that list was created by the MPA of my district who is also a minister. He created a list of projects with help of his political workers and that list of projects was approved by P&D department

because of his influence. If we send a list of our own to P&D, they will not consider it until and unless endorsed by our MPA.

When he was further asked why he does not stop them as it was clear waste of resources.

DC5: I also had the same feelings that they are wasting the resources of government, but I couldn't do or say anything. Even if I had said something nothing would have happened, the MPA Sahab would havegotten angry, and I would been transferred. It is important for our career to serve as DC, if we confrontthese politicians, they will not let us serve in any districts. We have our own limitations. (humari apne majburian hoti hai)

Observation Exhibit 3 Humari apne majburian hoti hai
Here the interviewee is expressing his necessitation for not doing much about fair resource allocation. This expression shows the willingness of him doing the right thing, but he cannot do it because of profound consequences he could face. They all fear that their careers could be ruined if they don't get in line.

Deputy Commissioner of one of the districts that had the lowest PSDP allocations explains that:

DC6: The MPA of this district was in opposition during the last tenure (2013-18) because of that he wasnot given funds. MPAs or any political person get funds based on his/her relationship with the CM that is the main factor for resource allocation in Balochistan. There is no thumb rule or any policy for PSDPallocations it depends on the influence and networking(thalukhat) of the MPA.

Observation Exhibit 4 Thalukhat
The denotative translation of this word can be network, but the connotative meaning of this word goes beyond that. In our society this word is used to express ultimate power, it is used to indicate that a person has type of connections that can get a work done. This word means you have connections with powerful actors responsible for major decisions in Balochistan.

Theme 2: Lack of Transparency and Accountability in Projects

During data collection, it was observed that the projects in progress lacks transparency and accountability measures. An officer of education department shares his experience:

DP1: It was very surprising to us as on papers the building was completed, we have even brought therequired furniture and equipment for the that college but there was no building on the ground.

He further shares:

DP1: Recently the CM visited the XYZ district and there we discovered that two of our colleges that werebuilt from MPA funds were completed in 2017 and we were not informed about this. So, when a projectis done from MPAs funds we cannot do any accountability about it as we are not informed

about it at any stage.

Another officer explains that they have the tools for monitoring and accountability, but they don't utilize them:

DP5: Planning commission has provided us with a set of tools such as PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4, and PC5 but unfortunately, we hardly use these tools. For example, PC2 is made before PC1 in which we do survey study related to the project. However, in Balochistan we do not do any survey studies. Then with help ofPC2 you make your PC1. Then we have PC3 that is there for weekly, monthly, or quarterly progress reports. Through PC3 we share our financial and physical progress with the department. Then we havePC4 that we submit at the end of the project. Finally, there is PC5 that we never, it is for the reflection ofthe whole project once it is completed. For the accountably we can use PC3 but sadly we do not have funds to go and conduct the visits to record the progress of any project.

An officer of social welfare department shares his experience:

DP3: We have a proforma for that PC2 of planning commission, it has a checklist an indicator, but we hardly follow it and make a feasibility. For last two years we are doing feasibility due to pressure by thehigh court or else we not concerned if a project is feasible or not. Then we have PC3 that we never use ittells us about the progress of a project on monthly or quarterly basis.

A Deputy Commissioner discusses why it is hard to do accountability:

DC1: Actually, things on ground are very complex, if someone is not performing their duty, we can stoptheir salary because of a supreme court order. Secondly, even if we cut their salary then the union will go on strike at district level if we ignore them, then they will start agitation at provincial level and thencountry wide. Then we get instruction to negotiate with them. So, instead of going in all this trouble wetend to ignore such things.

Another Deputy Commissioner explains how unaccountability is affecting the performance of departments:

DC3: The level of seriousness of departments like health and education is almost the same in all districts of Balochistan. You will hardly find a person serious about their job, reason being we have an ineffectivemechanism for accountability. They know even if they are terminated from their jobs they would be reinstated, even if a person is dismissed 10times he will be reinstated 10times. They are certain they will

never loss their jobs then why to perform. There should be an end to such things if we don't have deterrence for such people things will not change. Let me give you an example, after 10 years we were able to deduct the pays of staff in C&W and out of 1400 only 700 or something are performing their duties rest are still missing, we cannot fire. Command and control are weak, and they are getting patronage from influential people. If the CM can call you for a soldier (Sipahe) then you can very well imagine how well connected they are.

A Deputy Commissioner explains why they cannot punish their officers:

DC4: We don't have the authority to punish them and when we report it to the concern departments, they would hardly take any action against them. Maybe they are too busy in doing their jobs and do

notget time to check our reports or maybe they ignore it on purpose.

Member of Provincial Assembly asserts that the process must be more transparent:

MPA: We must make our system transparent, by transparency I mean people should know how much money is allocated and people can check the progress of each project in real time, what is the timeframe,how much money was spend and what are the targets.

Deputy Commissioner share his thoughts about transparency:

DC2: There is no collaboration, no information sharing, nothing among them (departments). The process is very simple write a concept paper at your home, get the signature of concern engineer, then drop it off at planning and development department, they will include it in the PSDP document, then it depends on your power (zor-e-bazu) or influence if it becomes the part of final budget document.

Observation Exhibit 5 Zor-e-bazu
This expression is used to compare power between two or more persons. Here the interviewee is implying that there is tug of war between different powerful actors and they win the war based on their power. This means that there is no room for merit or law for allocation of PSDP projects.

The findings of this research shows that there are inefficiencies and inequalities in the process of PSDP allocations in Balochistan. The process of PSDP allocations is influenced by political clientelismand there are impediments and shortcomings. Realizing them is vital for an effective PSDP allocations. The data from PSDP in Communication & Works, Education, Health and Social Welfare departments in the 10 districts during the last 10 years i.e., 2011 to 2021 indicates discrepancies in the allocation of PSDP to the departments. Some districts with more population and area have been receiving less funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts. This inefficiency justifies the purpose of this research as currently the Government of Balochistan has no proper model or matrixto allocate PSDP projects to the districts or even to the departments in an efficient manner. The analysis of quantitative data further highlights that the inconsideration of the population and area statistics leads to inefficient allocation of resources. More populated and large area districts are receiving lesser allocations from PSDP as shown in figures. Therefore, as discussed in literature review it is imperative to consider population and area as important factors for PSPD allocations.

This section will now answer all the three questions that are presented in the introduction section before giving the final conclusion and recommendations.

Question 1: How Political Clientelism Is Influencing the Process of PSDP Allocations in Balochistan?

The findings of this research clearly indicates that the process of PSDP allocations is influenced by political clientelism. High officials like the minister of finance shows his concern about it and admitsthat most of the projects are included to please the member of parliaments and their

followers. As argued by Berenschot (2018) the powerful political actors are reinforcing their influence by giving their supporters desired projects to create a sense of obligation that would ultimately be reciprocated in a time of need. While further explaining the influence of political actors another official ofeducation claims that schools or colleges are built without any need assessment, projects are included on the wishes of influential people.

As discussed by Stokes (2007) it is not necessary that the more powerful political actor take a public office. Even without a public office he would still be considered credible enough to promise his voters access to public resources. Politicians influence on state resources is so strong that Deputy Commissioners being the administrative head of a district is not taken into the loop while doing PSDP allocations of their districts. This resonates with the study of Berenschot & Aspinall (2020) that the politicians find ways to bypass, manipulate or abolish official procedures of resources distribution. They replace the prescribed standards for selecting recipients of government projects with their own political standards such as party loyalty. However, as asserted by Cruz and Keefer, (2015) that in developing countries high degree of discretionary control over the state resources is exercised by their bureaucrats seems to be missing in case of Balochistan. Hence the politician holds autonomous power, making them more powerful actors in resource allocation.

Apart from this not all the politicians seem to be influential enough to decide about PSDP of their constituency as a Deputy Commissioner explained that the member of parliament of his district wasin opposition for five years hence his district was allocated the lowest number of projects in PSDP. Due to this political victimization many districts in Balochistan faces development problems over the years. As explained by Gherghina & Nemčok, (2021) it has immense negative repercussions on the functions of democracy, especially on capability of administrations to deliver necessary public policies. The political parties in Balochistan are more focused to consolidate public resources and then supply it through their private links. This is one of the reasons that these political parties have less cohesion and their members tend to switch parties as they find any opportunity to do so.

This whole scenario is hampering the development of Balochistan. Services and goods to general public are underprovided while in some specific constituencies they are provided in abundance. The politicians are diverting scarce resources to create incentives for themselves to keep the general public dependent and poor. As a result, there is extreme levels of exploitation and corruption in Balochistan that is creating a trust deficit among the people of Balochistan. The political influence isso high that it has changed the basic accountability connection in the province and people go unpunished even after failing a project. This is hindering sustainable development and causing politicization of bureaucracy. Ultimately obstructing the system and creating governance issue. In order to stay in power, the powerful political actors will hold to this strategy to hold back income   growth and social mobility in Balochistan. Political clientelism is discouraging the administration from offering services and goods to public as it serves the interests of powerful political actors that thrive on poverty of Balochistan.

Question 2: How Effective Resource Allocation Can be Performed In Balochistan?

As argued if resource allocations are done without improvement in the process of fund allocation and supervision of the schemes then it is a zero-sum equation. Inefficiencies in fund allocations in Balochistan has let this research to find better ways to address the issues of resource allocation.

Themain aim of this research was to ascertain better ways for PSDP allocations in Balochistan. The findings of research indicate that the allocation of PSDP projects in Balochistan is disproportionate and unfair. The study has analysed the data on PSDP in Communication & Works, Education, Healthand Social Welfare departments in the 10 districts during the last 10 years i.e., 2011 to 2021. It was indicated by the results that there is unfairness on both accounts i.e., district level and departmentallevel. There are districts that have more population and area have been receiving less funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts.

Banking on the arguments of McGuire et al., (2020) for using a formulaic approach. Specially in caseof developing countries have tried to shift away from historical resource allocations and toward resource distribution based on metrics that try to capture variance in need. There are African countries that uses population weighting, Uganda, for example, developed a formula for allocating the health budget to districts based on a population index. Contemplating on these arguments to overcome discrepancies in Balochistan this study has proposed a mathematical model that uses weights for the population and area of each district. This research has used these parameters on thepremise that inconsideration of the population and area statistics leads to inefficient allocation of PSDP projects. More populated and large area districts are receiving lesser allocations from PSDP asshown in Table 2. Therefore, it is imperative to consider population and area as important factors while making development budget allocation. Table 3 shows the weights calculated for population and area for each district. Using the model as a case, the total amount of PSDP for the Year 2020 – 2021 was set as the input and the estimated amounts to be allocated to each district are stated in Table 4. Then in Table 5 the proposed amounts are further distributed to departments of each district.

This study envisaged that only proposing a financial model for funds allocation would not suffice, hence it constructed a matrix that will help the decision maker to select the best PSDP projects for each department. Stemming this argument from Kurth et al (2017) that complex decisions such as public resources allocations must create a balance among technical, economic, and political considerations; this paper propose a matrix that helps in prioritization of scarce resources in a reasonable and transparent way. So that the decisions about PSDP allocations must involve all the stakeholders. This study uses a matrix known as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). This tool is created with the goal of providing ordering for decision makers from least preferred to most preferred option (Dodgson et al, 2009).

MCDA will help in analysing the problem in light of realistic information that will allow data and judgements to be more objective. It will help in decision making, but not to take the decision (Kurth et al, 2017). This matrix offers diverse ways of examining the multifaceted issue of resource allocation by gauging the impacts of options on set criteria. This tool is an organized and official platform for engaging all stakeholders. It will provide means to interface with strictly rigorous analysis while working beyond quantitative analysis. Finally, MCDA will also help government of Balochistan in decision justification and checks (Dodgson et al, 2009).

Question 3: What are Policy Inputs for Improvement of PSDP allocations in Balochistan?

Contemplating on Jobaid & Khan, (2018) this research proposes at the time of development budgeting spatial distribution should be considered. Most importantly the allocation should be made without any bias and influence as such influence and biases would turn some districts stronger and others weaker. Furthermore, governments of Balochistan should include each

district's local government body to know their need and responsibilities. The government need to adopt a bottom-up approach to understand the real development needs of departments. It is imperative to conduct proper monitoring along with assessment of utilization of money that is allocated to these projects.

The government of Balochistan must use a formulaic approach for development budgeting based onperformance, political goals, and fairness (McGuire et al., 2020). The efficiency in this context meansthat public money is spent as per policies developed (or to be developed) for the wise use of resources. While every political party should have a certain commitment and set promises within itscommunity in terms of addressing their needs. The government to shift away from historical resource allocations and toward resource distribution based on metrics that try to capture the ground reality.

Grounded on evidence by Williams, St Denny & Bristow (2019) this study further suggests that a single approach for budgeting would make it difficult for government. We understand that budget decisions are getting progressively difficult specially during the times of reduced public sector budget and austerity as the people of Balochistan are demanding more public services. In recent times the public has minimal trust in the political process as they feel limited engagement in any political decision. As Park et al, (2013) suggest during such times we can gain public trust by involving them in the process. The government of Balochistan can decide their level of participation depending on their preferences. They may only inform them through objective and balanced information or can obtain their feedback about alternative opportunities and solutions. On the other hand, the public can be involved throughout the process to understand their concerns and aspirations in a better way. In best case scenario the public and government can work in a partnership and decide the course of action through joint decision making.

However, if the government of Balochistan finds it difficult to engage the public in these traditional ways they can opt innovative ways such as consensuses conferences, planning cells, deliberative polls, citizens' assemblies, and citizens juries to engage public at a micro level that can also facilitatedeliberation and participation (Escobar and Elstub 2017). The government can use the concept of 'mini public' for such engagement. Mini publics are randomly nominated residents following the principle that stakeholders affected by the issue has an equal chance of being selected to ensure legitimacy of the process. The government need to maintain a balanced relationship between the political and economic environments and civil society organizations. They seem to be important in understanding differences in institutional design and outcomes before deciding on allocations (Sintomer et al., 2012).

Along with engaging the public the government need to insure that the whole process of PSDP is improved. The government of Balochistan need to ensure transparency by providing information about decisions taken in the process. For a budget to be more effective it should be managed on the following four principles such as: multiyear planning, transparency, public expenditure consolidation and effectiveness and efficiency. For this the stakeholders need to ensure planning of tasks, expenditure, objectives, and their effects on yearly basis. Transparency can be achieved through clarity, comparability, legibility of financial statements. The consolidation of public expenditure can be achieved through synergy of revenue and expenditure with assigned tasks. Finally, efficiency and effectiveness mean matching the planned tasks, expenditure, objectives with the outcome achieved. Government needs to establish a relation between resource allocation

and results to increase productivity. The departments can ensure efficiency by measuring and promoting progress, while making evidence-based policymaking by basing decisions on performance data.

CONCLUSION

Balochistan has always been on the development agenda of every political party but sadly we have not witnessed any meaningful development in the region. The Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) is considered as a key component in improving the socio-economic outlook of anarea. However, successive governments have failed to rationalise it despite repeated directions from the high court to plan it in an effective manner, the current mechanism used in Balochistan for development budget allocations can be best described as incremental (Green et al., 2000). Franklin & Ebdon (2020) and O'Hagan et al. (2020), claim that in theory, development budget allocation should be done with the involvement of focal persons in case of Balochistan the district health or education officers at the grassroots level. However, contrary to Panday & Chowdhury (2020) and Williams et al (2019), in Balochistan centralized approach is used, where most of the decision are taken by the provincial capital, Quetta. Mostly, departments do allocations without involvement of key stakeholders such as people or private sectors (Escobar et. al, 2018). Furthermore, any changes such as, addition/deletion in resources are done on political clientelism. This research concludes that there is no specific plan or policy for development budget allocation in Balochistan as suggested in theory (Dias & Julio, 2018; Franklin, Krane& Ebdon, 2013; Glodfrank, 2012).

Apart from this there are other weaknesses in the process, such as, we can hardly witness any productive debates being conducted for budget allocations (Head, 2007). Majority of budget meetings are rushed, and their sessions are not long enough to ensure that the process is as inclusive and successful as it should be (Bostan et al, 2021; Jobaid & Khan, 2018: Jackobsen et al, 2016). Finally, a budget document is presented in the assembly for approval without any discussion by the members. Hence, as argued by McGuire et al (2020) the PSDP allocations turns out to be a mismatchbetween the people's need, the required facility, and allocated resources. There is a huge gap between what certain districts actually need and what they get.

The findings of this research show that there are inefficiencies and inequalities in the process of PSDP allocations Balochistan. The process of PSDP allocations is not free of political leverage and there are impediments and shortcomings and realizing them is vital for an effective allocation. The data from PSDP in Communication & Works, Education, Health and Social Welfare departments in the 10 districts during the last 10 years i.e., 2011 to 2021 indicates that discrepancies in the allocation of

 PSDP to the departments are quite evident. Some districts with more population and area have beenreceiving less funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts.

While further looking at the qualitative findings of this study concludes that the process of PSDP allocations is influenced by political power and as discussed in the literature review it is conceptualised as political clientelism. This research further concludes that the process in non-participatory where major stakeholders such as district level officials or public are ignored. The serious issues in implementation of PSDP further influence the whole process. The need assessmentfor resources allocation is misdirected hence the benefits are not transferred to public. Most importantly there is a lack of transparency and accountability in the projects because of which inefficiencies are encountered.

This whole scenario is hampering the development of Balochistan. Services and goods to general public are underprovided while in some specific constituencies they are provided in abundance. The politicians are diverting scarce resources to create incentives for themselves to keep the general public dependent and poor. As a result, there is extreme levels of exploitation and corruption in Balochistan that is creating a trust deficit among the people of Balochistan. The political influence isso high that it has changed the basic accountability connection in the province and people go unpunished even after failing a project. This is hindering sustainable development and causing politicization the bureaucracy. This is ultimately obstructing the system and creating governance issue. In order to stay in power, the powerful political actors will hold to this strategy to hold back income growth and social mobility in Balochistan. Political clientelism is discouraging the administration from offering services and goods to public as it serves the interests of powerful political actors that thrive on poverty of Balochistan. To overcome these issues this paper, have the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS / POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Banking on the arguments of McGuire et al., (2020) for using a formulaic approach. Specially in case of developing countries have tried to shift away from historical resource allocations and toward resource distribution based on metrics that try to capture variance in need. Contemplating on these arguments to overcome discrepancies in Balochistan this study has proposed a mathematical model that uses weights for the population and area of each district. These parameters are used on the premise that inconsideration of the population and area statistics leads to inefficient allocation of resources as shown in the findings.

This study envisioned that only proposing a financial model for resources allocation would not suffice, hence it designed a matrix that will help the decision maker to select the best project for each department. Stemming our argument from Kurth et al (2017) that complex decisions such as public resources allocation must create a balance among technical, economic, and political considerations; we propose a matrix that helps in prioritization of scarce resources in a reasonable and transparent way. So that the decisions about resource allocation must involve all the stakeholders.

Contemplating on Jobaid & Khan, (2018) this research recommends at the allocations should be made without any bias and influence as such influence and biases would turn some districts stronger and others weaker. Furthermore, governments of Balochistan should include each district's local government body to know their need and responsibilities. Grounded on evidence by Williams, St

 Denny & Bristow (2019) this study further suggests that a single approach for budgeting would make it difficult for government. This study understands that budget decisions are getting progressively difficult specially during the times of reduced public sector budget and austerity as the people of Balochistan are demanding more public services. In recent times the public has minimal trust in the political process as they feel limited engagement in any political decision. As suggested during such times we can gain public trust by involving them in the process. Along with engaging the public the government need to insure that the whole process of PSDP is improved. The government of Balochistan need to ensure transparency by providing information about decisions taken in the process.

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